January 21st: A memo by Dannecker notes that:
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service [Heydrich] has already received orders from the Fuehrer through the Reichsfuehrer-SS, to submit a project for a Final solution" and that "This will extend to the work preceding the wholesale deportation of the Jews as well as to the planning to the last detail of a settlement action in the territory yet to be determined (cited by Browning, pp.6-7).March 20th: Eichmann refers to the conversation between Hitler and Heydrich In January but says that "the General Government is not at present is not at present in a position to receive one Jew or Pole from the Old Reich" (Kay, p.110, citing IfZ, MA 423). However, on March 17th, Hitler had promised Frank that the GG would be Jew-free (Kay, p.110, citing Frank diary 26.3.41). Thus the GG was to be an interim point between the Reich and the USSR for deported Jews.
March 26th: Heydrich meets Goering and discusses proposals that included a draft concerning the Jewish Question. Heydrich noted in his report:
10. Bezüglich der Lösung der Judenfrage berichtete ich kurz dem Reichsmarschall und legte ihm meinen Entwurf vor, dem er mit einer Änderung bezüglich der Zuständigkeit Rosenbergs zustimmte und Wiedervorlage befahl.One of the recipients of a copy of Heydrich's report was Eichmann, therefore clearly this concerned resettlement. As the meeting was discussing the Ostministers, clearly the resettlement zone was to be in the USSR. (Full German document is in VEJ, 7, Dok. 1 pp.113-117; translation of quote is by Kay, p.109; Eichmann's name as recipient is noted in VEJ 7, p.113n.3 and by Kay, p.109).
Carlo Mattogno (in the Riposte, p.199) cites Goetz Aly's discussion of this passage and even quotes Aly on the meaning: "daß sich Heydrichs Überlegungen für die ‘Lösung der Judenfrage’ spätestens seit März 1941 auf das Territorium der Sowjetunion bezogen." However, Mattogno bizarrely views the concentration of Jews into the USSR as a mere preliminary to deporting them on to Madagascar after the war (Riposte, p.536), based on an opportunistic reading of Goebbels' diary entry of March 7th, 1942, that would have made no economic or military sense.
April 2nd: Rosenberg also proposes Russia as the resettlement area, calling it a dumping ground:
In this way all other areas would be offered at the same time the possibility of making extensive use of that part of Russia con- trolled by Moscow as a dumping ground for undesirable elements of the population (1017-PS, NCA III, pp.674-681, here p.676).
April 7th: Rosenberg discusses the prospects of extermination in Leningrad and Moscow:
In addition, it will eventually become necessary to occupy with troops not only Petersburg, but also Moscow. This occupation will definitely differ considerably from that in the Baltic provinces, in the Ukraine and in the Caucasus. It will be accomplished by suppressing any Russian and Bolshevik resistance and will necessitate an absolutely ruthless person, both as regards the military representation and also the eventual political direction. The problems arising from this need not be detailed here. If it is not intended to maintain a permanent military administration, the undersigned would recommend the Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch as Reich Commissar in Moscow (1019-PS, NCA III, pp.681-685, here p.682).May 2nd: Discussion [of the] Staatssekretaere 2.5.41: "x million people will doubtlessly starve, if that which is necessary for us is extracted from the land." (Kay, p.124)
May 7th: Rosenberg argues for decimation of Ukrainian Jews via pogroms, ethnic cleansing by the Ukrainians, and ghettoization:
After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices, the Jewish question will have to have a decisive solution, through the institution of Ghettos. Insofar as the Jews have not been driven out by the Ukrainians themselves, the small communities must be lodged in large camps, in order to be kept busy by means of forced labor, in the same way as it has already been the practice in [Lodz] (1028-PS, NCA III, p.690).May 23rd: Report by the Agriculture Group, based on recommendations by Backe. The USSR would be split into two (a productive and an unproductive zone) and surplus populations redirected to Siberia, even though “railway transportation is out of the question”. The document stated further that "The consequences will be cessation of supplies to the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg." For these areas, the document noted, "It will be necessary to divert the population into the Siberian spaces. Since rail transport is out of the question, this too, will be an extremely difficult problem." The report then admitted that “This will inevitably result in an extinction of industry as well as of a large part of the people.” (EC-126, IMT XXXVI, pp.135-57. English translation in NCA, VII, pp.295-306, here pp.297, 298 and 305)
June 20th: Rosenberg speaks of extermination in Russia:
The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims on the East; and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings.
A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to determine to which extent industries can still be maintained there (wagon factories etc.). The consideration and execution of this policy in the Rus- sian area proper is for the German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the evacuation in consideration. The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest characters. Perhaps, this decision will also be approved by a coming Russian later, not in 30 but maybe in a 100 years. For the Russian soul has been torn in the struggle of the last 200 years. The original Russians are excellent artistic craftsmen, dancers and musicians. They have certain hereditary talents, but these talents are different from- those of the Western people. The fight between Turgnjew and Dostejewsky was symbolic for the nation. The Russian soul found no outlet either way. If we now close the West to the Russians, they might become conscious of their own inborn, proper forces and of the area to which they belong. A historian will maybe see this decision in a different light, in hundreds of years than it might appear to a Russian today (1058-PS, NCA III, pp.716-717).